As net migration trends toward zero, the real danger isn’t who arrives or leaves—it’s whether Britain is turning away the very people who make it richer.
Britain’s net migration may soon drop to levels unseen since the early 1990s. The latest figures show a sharp two‑thirds decline, with 204,000 more arrivals than departures. In Westminster, that statistic will be trumpeted as progress—proof, perhaps, that border “control” has finally been restored. Yet behind the political celebration lies a far more consequential question: will this make Britain richer or poorer?
For years, the UK’s growth has rested on adding workers, not improving productivity. The economy expanded because more people entered the labour force, not because those already working became more efficient. Fewer incoming workers mean slower overall growth, but the effect on living standards depends on who comes and goes. A thousand young engineers boost GDP per person; a thousand new dependants do not.
The quality of migration matters more than the quantity
The recent fall in net migration hides an uncomfortable truth: Britain is not only attracting fewer people but may also be losing many of its most productive workers. Engineers, scientists, and managers are leaving faster than they’re being replaced. If that trend continues, shrinking the migrant population could shrink the economy’s dynamism with it.
Fiscal health depends on composition. A skilled 25‑year‑old taxpayer is a net contributor—paying for the NHS, pensions, and infrastructure. But migration that relies on lower-paid workers to fill essential but underfunded roles in healthcare or social care only postpones larger costs. Those same workers will eventually draw on the same public services they helped sustain.
Britain has long masked deep structural weaknesses with cheap imported labour. Public services suppress domestic wages, then fill vacancies from abroad, especially in the NHS and care sectors. That bargain looks frugal today but costly tomorrow. To end reliance on low-wage migration, the government must mobilize Britain’s nine million inactive working-age citizens—training, paying, and equipping them to fill roles that now depend on migration.
A system built on contribution, not numbers
The way the Office for Budget Responsibility models migration encourages more of it by default, treating the average migrant as just another taxpaying adult. But not all migrants—or taxpayers—contribute equally over their lifetime. A 25‑year‑old earning £45,000 adds far more to the national purse than a 55‑year‑old earning the same. Policy should reflect these differences instead of chasing politically convenient net targets.
Public sentiment, often caricatured as anti-immigration, is in fact pragmatic. Voters care about fairness and contribution. They value skilled, legal migration but resent systems that feel uncontrolled or unbalanced. A falling migration number might pacify headlines, but it cannot fix underlying frustrations about low wages, poor productivity, and stretched services.
The illusion of control
Britain’s migration debate has become obsessed with the wrong metric. Net migration tells us nothing about national prosperity. A figure of zero could describe a resilient, advanced economy—or a stagnant one so unattractive that talent stays away.
The real test lies not in how few people we admit or how many we send away, but in whether the system rewards those who build Britain’s future. Without a focus on skills, productivity, and contribution, “net zero migration” risks becoming not an economic triumph—but a sign of decline.
Source: Julia Willemyns, “Would net-zero migration make Britain richer or poorer?”, The New Statesman
